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Background: Within maintenance models of social anxiety disorder (SAD), a number of cognitive and
behavioural factors that drive the persistence of SAD have been proposed. However, these maintenance
models do not address how SAD develops, or the origins of the proposed maintaining factors. There are
also models of the development of SAD that have been proposed independently from maintenance
models. These models highlight multiple factors that contribute risk to the onset of SAD, but do not
address how these aetiological factors may lead to the development of the maintaining factors associated
with SAD.
Methods: A systematic review of the literature was conducted to identify aetiological and maintenance
models of SAD. We then united key factors identiﬁed in these models and formulated an integrated
aetiological and maintenance (IAM) model of SAD. A systematic review of the literature was then con-
ducted on the components of the IAM model.
Results: A number of aetiological and maintaining factors were identiﬁed in models of SAD. These factors
could be drawn together into the IAM model. On balance, there is empirical evidence for the association
of each of the factors in the IAM model with social anxiety or SAD, providing preliminary support for the
model.
Limitations: There are relationships between components of the IAM model that require empirical at-
tention. Future research will need to continue to test the IAM model.
Conclusions: The IAM model provides a framework for future investigations into the development and
persistence of SAD.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is characterised by a recurrent
and intense anxious response to social or performance situations
in which evaluation from other people may occur (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Incidence rates for the dis-
order are highest during childhood and adolescence (e.g., between
10 and 20 years of age; Beesdo et al., 2007; Wittchen et al., 1999)
and once the disorder manifests, it typically follows a chronic
course (Wittchen and Fehm, 2003). Prominent psychological
models of the maintenance of SAD specify key cognitive and be-
havioural factors that account for the continued experience of
social-evaluative anxiety in individuals who are already diagnosed
with SAD (Clark and Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; Hofmann,
2007; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). These models have stimulated
a large body of research and treatment protocols derived from
these models have been found to be efﬁcacious (e.g., Clark et al.,
2003; Rapee et al., 2009). By their nature, these models aim to
describe the maintaining factors of SAD. However, they do not
specify in detail an aetiological basis for the disorder or indicate
how the maintaining factors might develop. Largely independently
of these maintenance models, several aetiological models for SAD
have also been proposed (e.g., Hofmann and Barlow, 2002; Rapee
and Spence, 2004). These latter models specify biological, psy-
chological, and social factors that increase risk for the develop-
ment of SAD. However, these models do not specify the origins of
factors that maintain the disorder, or point to links between ae-
tiological and maintaining factors. Although there have been ef-
forts to integrate the aetiology and maintenance of SAD (Higa-
McMillan and Ebesutani, 2011; Kimbrel, 2008), there is currently
still no model that comprehensively integrates what are con-
sidered to be the key aetiological and maintaining factors of SAD in
the literature.
In this paper, we aim to develop such a model. We ﬁrst present
a systematic review of the theoretical literature on SAD to ascer-
tain existing aetiological and maintenance models of the disorder
and related review papers. The broad coverage of this systematic
review allows us to determine a comprehensive set of aetiological
and maintaining factors for SAD that are proposed in the literature
and considered to be theoretically important. Next, we unite these
factors and present an integrated aetiological and maintenance
(IAM) model of SAD. Alongside our descriptions of the components
of this model, we present a systematic review of the empirical
literature on each component and specify which parts of the
model require further empirical testing. Again, the broad coverage
of these systematic reviews allows us to determine the extent of
empirical support for each of the components of the model. In the
ﬁnal section, we elaborate upon directions for future research
based on our integrated model. As will be evident, the IAM model
adds incremental value to the literature over and above existing
aetiological and maintenance models because it encompasses a
comprehensive set of aetiological and maintaining factors cur-
rently considered to be theoretically signiﬁcant and is based on a
thorough examination of the empirical literature. Moreover, the
IAM model speciﬁes novel links between aetiological andmaintaining factors, clariﬁes novel research directions, and should
help to improve both treatment and prevention.2. Method
2.1. Systematic search strategy
Models related to the aetiology and maintenance of SAD were
obtained via an examination of articles (including reference lists)
that were found from a systematic electronic database search
of PsycINFO and Scopus using combinations of the following
keywords: theory, theoretical, model, social anxiety, social phobia,
and social anxiety disorder. A similar search strategy was used
when obtaining studies for the empirical evaluation of the com-
ponents of the IAM model (e.g., for anticipatory processing, the
above databases were searched using a combination of the key
terms: anticipatory processing, social anxiety, social phobia,
and social anxiety disorder). The following inclusion criteria for
articles were also applied to all database searches: (a) reported in
English, (b) abstract available, (c) for PsycINFO year published
between 1900 and 2015, and for Scopus year published between
1960 and 2015, and (d) article contained in journal or book. In
addition, the database search for models of SAD was restricted to
reviews. After unique articles were obtained from the database
searches, the titles and abstracts of articles were screened to de-
termine their relevance. Articles that could be immediately ex-
cluded during screening were removed from further considera-
tion. Full texts of articles that passed the screening were then
obtained. For the database search for models of SAD, full text ar-
ticles were assessed for whether they contained such a model. For
the search for studies for the empirical evaluation of the compo-
nents of the IAM model, full text articles were evaluated as to
whether it contained a study that examined an empirical re-
lationship between the factor/process of interest and social anxi-
ety or SAD.3. Results and discussion
Search results are shown in Tables 1–4, and these tables are
also referred to in the relevant sections below. Given space lim-
itations, cited articles in this paper are only illustrative of the
pattern of ﬁndings from our systematic searches and are not ex-
haustive. Where possible, recent papers have been cited.1
3.1. Factors involved in the aetiology of SAD
Over the last 20 years, a number of reviews of risk factors for
SAD along with theories about their interrelationships have been
published (e.g., Morrison and Heimberg, 2013; Higa-McMillan and
Ebesutani, 2011; Kimbrel, 2008; Ollendick and Benoit, 2012; Wong
Table 1
Systematic search results: models of SAD.
Model search
Records identiﬁed through data-
base searching
PsycINFO¼86
Scopus¼208 (26 from reference lists)
Records after duplicates removed 287
Records screened by title/abstract 68 (219 excluded)
Full-text articles assessed for
eligibility
31 had no model (contained a review);
8 full text unavailable
Studies included in systematic
review
29 had a model
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chological, and social factors have been identiﬁed that increase
risk for the development of SAD. While most papers have been
descriptive (e.g., summarised proposed aetiological factors and
evidence for them), some of the papers have offered a greater level
of explanation (e.g., proposed how aetiological factors operate and
interact to produce SAD; see also Table 1). Some examples of the
most recent papers that have provided integrated predictions of
relations between aetiological factors and SAD are provided in
Table 5. Across these papers several common factors have been
suggested. There appears to be widespread acceptance for the
importance of genetic predispositions and temperament as early
risk factors for SAD. Similarly, most authors ascribe important
inﬂuence to early cognitive biases, negative social or life experi-
ences, as well as parent/child relationships and relationships with
peers. There appears to be less widespread emphasis on additional
factors including the inﬂuence of biological factors, the impact of
performance deﬁcits and general learning processes, and the
shaping inﬂuence of cultural factors.
3.2. Factors involved in the maintenance of SAD
Over the past several decades, numerous models have drawn
on psychological concepts to account for the maintenance of SAD
(e.g., Clark and Wells, 1995; Heimberg et al., 2010; Hofmann, 2007;
Rapee and Heimberg, 1997; Trower and Gilbert, 1989; see also
Table 1). Several of the more recent models (Clark and Wells, 1995;
Hofmann, 2007; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997) and subsequent re-
vised models (e.g., Heimberg et al., 2010) have become prominent
in the social anxiety literature. Across these prominent main-
tenance models of SAD, it is proposed that individuals with the
disorder engage in maladaptive cognitive and behavioural pro-
cesses that maintain an anxious response whenever social-eva-
luative situations are encountered. Speciﬁc cognitive and beha-
vioural maintaining processes are proposed that occur before,
during, and after social-evaluative situations. Table 6 summarises
the components proposed within each of the more prominent
models. As can be seen, models of the maintenance of SAD are
relatively consistent and agree on the importance of several key
factors including: anticipatory and post-event processing, avoid-
ance and escape behaviours, attentional biases (including both
self-focus and external threat focus), safety behaviours, perfor-
mance deﬁcits, and negative self processing. Interestingly, cogni-
tive avoidance appears to be a factor that has only recently been
proposed.
3.3. Integrating aetiology and maintenance: the IAM model of SAD
3.3.1. Overview of the model
We propose an integrated aetiological and maintenance (IAM)
model of SAD based on our systematic review of the current the-
oretical and empirical literatures. In the model, we specify
Table 3
Systematic database search results: the SET principle of the IAM model.
Amygdala reactivity Social-evaluative cognitions
Records identiﬁed through
database searching
PsycINFO¼190 PsycINFO¼205
Scopus¼70 (1 from reference lists) Scopus¼201 (15 from reference lists)
Records after duplicates
removed
216 280
Records screened by title/
abstract
81 (135 excluded) 165 (115 excluded)
Full-text articles assessed for
eligibility
36 had no relevant data or analysis 75 had no relevant data or analysis; 1 full text unavailable
Studies included in systematic
review
45 in total: 31 CS had positive association between amygdala
reactivity and SA/SAD; 12 CS had null ﬁndings; 2 CS had mixed
ﬁndings.
89 in total: 72 CS and 9 E had positive association between social-
evaluative cognitions and SA/SAD; 4 CS had null ﬁndings; 1 CS and 1 E
had mixed ﬁndings.
2 E had positive association between social-evaluative cognitions and
SA/SAD but moderated by third variable.
Note. SA¼social anxiety; SAD¼social anxiety disorder; CS¼cross-sectional studies; L¼ longitudinal studies; E¼experimental studies.
Q.J.J. Wong, R.M. Rapee / Journal of Affective Disorders 203 (2016) 84–100 87aetiological factors that have a theoretical and empirical basis and
that are most likely to exert their inﬂuence early in life as SAD
typically has its onset between the ages of 10 and 20 (e.g., Beesdo
et al., 2007). We ﬁrst present the argument that speciﬁc aetiolo-
gical factors will determine the threat value that is assigned to
social-evaluative stimuli (see Fig. 1; cf. Hofmann and Barlow,
2002). We further propose the argument that the threat value of
social-evaluative stimuli is represented in an operating principle
that guides an individual's functioning in their environment. For
simplicity, we henceforth refer to this operating principle as the
social-evaluative threat (SET) principle. Additionally, we hence-
forth refer to the ‘threat value of social-evaluative stimuli’ simply
as ‘threat value.’ The SET principle is conceptualised as an in-
dividual difference variable such that various expressions of the
principle in the population lie on a continuum where social-eva-
luative stimuli can have low to high threat values. Aetiological
factors have the potential to increase the threat value and such an
increase encourages the development of primary cognitive pro-
cesses to detect social-evaluative threat (i.e., self-focus, attention
to threat in the environment) and primary behavioural processes
that eliminate social-evaluative threat (i.e., avoidance and escape).
Hence in this model we propose these developmental pathways as
novel links that connect aetiological factors to speciﬁc factors that
are theoretically and empirically associated with the maintenance
of SAD.
We further propose that development of the primary cognitive
and behavioural processes increase the likelihood of: (a) the
maintenance of the threat value assigned to social-evaluative sti-
muli, (b) the development of performance deﬁcits (due to anxiety,
limited attention, or a lack of age-appropriate social skills/knowl-
edge), and (c) the development of secondary cognitive processes
that aim to detect social-evaluative threat (i.e., anticipatory pro-
cessing, post-event processing) and secondary cognitive and be-
havioural processes that aim to eliminate social-evaluative threat
(i.e., cognitive avoidance and safety behaviours, respectively). Each
of these components that develop out of the primary cognitive and
behavioural processes is also proposed to maintain the threat va-
lue represented in the SET principle. The developmental pathways
between the primary processes, performance deﬁcits, and sec-
ondary processes in the IAM model provide additional novel links
that ultimately connect aetiological factors with other speciﬁc
factors that are theoretically and empirically associated with the
maintenance of SAD.
Notably, it is evident that a number of components in the IAM
model are expected to operate as maintaining factors for the threat
value represented in the SET principle. We point out though that
the maintaining factors referred to in the IAM model (see Fig. 1)
are those that have been previously used to explain thepersistence of SAD (cf. Table 6). However, these maintaining fac-
tors have been re-conceptualised in the IAM model and used to
explain maintenance of the threat value represented in the SET
principle rather than expression of the clinical disorder.
An increase in the threat value represented in the SET principle
has one other important consequence; it leads an individual to
experience more frequent anxiety and higher levels of anxiety in
social-evaluative situations. Consistent with previous suggestions
in the literature (e.g., Rapee and Spence, 2004), more frequent/
severe levels of social-evaluative anxiety will be associated with a
diagnosis of SAD but this association will be imperfect because
diagnosis also requires an assessment of whether the levels of
social-evaluative anxiety cause personal distress or are deemed to
interfere with one's functioning. Thus, although more frequent/
severe levels of social-evaluative anxiety may not result in a di-
agnosis of SAD, they are expected at least to increase the likelihood
of life interference and SAD onset. As is evident from our de-
scription, the SET principle is a separate construct to social-eva-
luative anxiety, as well as a diagnosis of SAD (see also Fig. 1).
Overall, the IAM model provides a novel account of how par-
ticular risk factors for SAD ultimately increase the probability of
the emergence of maintaining factors as well as increase the
likelihood of disorder onset. We assume that individuals can be
exposed to different patterns of aetiological factors and conse-
quently have similar changes in the threat value represented in
their SET principles (cf. equiﬁnality; Cicchetti and Rogosch, 1996;
Ollendick and Hirshfeld-Becker, 2002). Moreover, we assume that
individuals may be exposed in a similar way to a set of aetiological
factors, but have different outcomes in terms of the threat value
that is given to social-evaluative stimuli (cf. multiﬁnality). Each of
the key components of the IAM model will be elaborated upon in
the following sections.
3.3.2. The social-evaluative threat (SET) principle
The core component in the IAM model is the SET principle that
captures the extent that social-evaluative stimuli are threatening
and guides an individual's functioning. Social-evaluative stimuli
have their source from other people and either implicitly or ex-
plicitly convey judgement to the individual. As such, the term
‘social-evaluative stimuli’ for example includes (but is not limited
to) facial expressions (e.g., angry expressions, neutral expressions,
or smiling expressions), eye contact (e.g., direct eye gaze or avoi-
dant eye gaze), gestures and postures (e.g., arms crossed or
dominant posturing), as well as a variety of behaviours (e.g., in-
dividual leaves a room or individual becomes aggressive) that
convey an indication of evaluation. In addition, the term ‘social-
evaluative stimuli’ can refer to higher-order social concepts that
convey an indication of evaluation (e.g., authority, social status,
Table 4
Systematic database search results: the maintaining factors of the IAM model.
Anticipatory
processing
Avoidance or escape Self-focus Attentional bias to
threat
Safety behaviours Cognitive avoidance Performance deﬁcits Post-event processing
Records identi-
ﬁed through
database
searching
PsycINFO¼21 PsycINFO¼404 PsycINFO¼98 PsycINFO¼35 PsycINFO¼84 PsycINFO¼43 PsycINFO¼66 PsycINFO¼69
Scopus¼19 (2 from re-
ference lists)
Scopus¼476 (5 from re-
ference lists)
Scopus¼85 (1 from re-
ference lists)
Scopus¼17 (25 from
reference lists)
Scopus¼61 Scopus¼34 Scopus¼57 (5 from
reference lists)
Scopus¼63
Records after
duplicates
removed
24 757 112 64 94 53 91 72
Records
screened by
title/abstract
22 (2 excluded) 141 (616 excluded) 72 (40 excluded) 52 (12 excluded) 42 (52 excluded) 16 (37 excluded) 29 (62 excluded) 62 (10 excluded)
Full-text articles
assessed for
eligibility
4 had no relevant data
or analysis
81 had no relevant data
or analysis; 7 full text
unavailable
37 had no relevant data
or analysis
7 had no relevant data
or analysis
15 had no relevant data
or analysis
4 had no relevant data
or analysis
8 had no relevant data
or analysis
14 had no relevant data
or analysis
Studies included
in systematic
review
18 in total: 10 CS had
positive association
between anticipatory
processing and SA/
SAD; 7 E showed AP
leads to negative out-
comes; 1 E had null
ﬁndings.
53 in total: 45 CS had
positive association be-
tween avoidance/escape
with SA/SAD; 5 E showed
exposure/training ap-
proach behaviour leads to
positive outcomes; 1 CS
and 1 E had null ﬁndings;
1 E had mixed ﬁndings.
35 in total: 22 CS had
positive association be-
tween self-focus and SA/
SAD; 7 E showed in-
creasing self-focus leads
to negative outcomes;
1 CS and 5 E had null
ﬁndings.
45 in total: 29 CS had
positive association be-
tween attentional bias
to threat and SA/SAD;
5 E showed training
away from threat leads
to positive outcomes;
1 E showed training to-
wards threat leads to
negative outcomes; 7 CS
and 3 E had null
ﬁndings.
27 in total: 21 CS had
positive association be-
tween safety behaviours
and SA/SAD; 5 E
showed decreasing
safety behaviours leads
to positive outcomes;
1 E showed increasing
safety behaviours leads
to negative outcomes;
no null ﬁndings.
12 in total: 9 CS, 1 L,
1 E had positive asso-
ciation between cog-
nitive avoidance and
SA/SAD; no null ﬁnd-
ings; 1 CS had mixed
ﬁndings.
21 in total: 12 CS had
positive association
between performance
deﬁcits and SA/SAD;
7 CS had null ﬁndings;
2 CS had mixed
ﬁndings.
48 in total: 25 CS and 12
L had positive associa-
tion between post-event
processing and SA/SAD;
8 E showed post-event
processing leads to ne-
gative outcomes; 1 CS
and 2 E had null
ﬁndings.
Note. SA¼social anxiety; SAD¼social anxiety disorder; CS¼cross-sectional studies; L¼ longitudinal studies; E¼experimental studies.
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evaluative stimuli are threatening via a threat value that is as-
signed to stimuli. We propose that a threat value for a speciﬁc type
of social-evaluative stimulus can be changed independently of
other threat values (e.g., threat value is increased for angry facial
expressions only) and threat values can also be changed simulta-
neously for several types of stimuli. Although social-evaluative
stimuli include the range of stimuli described, we refer to social-
evaluative stimuli in a general sense in subsequent sections for
simplicity.
An important aspect of the IAM model is our proposition that
the SET principle is reﬂected at both the neurobiological and
cognitive levels. That is, changes in the threat value represented in
the SET principle are realised in particular changes to an in-
dividual's neurobiology and cognitive processes.2 In terms of
neurobiology, a review of the literature suggests that aberrant
amygdala activity is one part of the neurobiological representation
of the SET principle (e.g., see Brühl et al., 2014; Cisler and Koster,
2010; Fouche et al., 2013; Shin and Liberzon, 2010, for reviews; see
Hattingh et al., 2013, for a meta-analysis; see also Table 3). For
example, our review yielded fMRI studies with cross-sectional
designs only, the majority of which demonstrated that relative to
non-anxious controls, individuals already diagnosed with SAD
exhibited greater amygdala activation in social-evaluative situa-
tions or when viewing stimuli related to social-evaluative threat
(e.g., faces displaying negative emotions, critical comments refer-
ring to the self; e.g., Blair et al., 2008; Lorberbaum et al., 2004;
Phan et al., 2006).
Several studies have suggested other neurobiological factors
that may also represent the SET principle. For example, cross-
sectional fMRI studies have shown that individuals already diag-
nosed with SAD exhibited a range of other aberrant brain activity,
including: dysfunctional prefrontal cortex activity (e.g., Blair et al.,
2011; Ding et al., 2011), dysfunctional connectivity of the amygdala
(Pannekoek et al., 2013), dysfunctional connectivity between
frontal and limbic areas (Baur et al., 2013), and dysfunctional ac-
tivity in a range of other brain regions (see e.g., Gentili et al., 2009;
Klumpp et al., 2012; Sareen et al., 2007). The ﬁndings in these
latter studies have not been replicated to the same extent as the
amygdala ﬁndings. Notably, the fMRI studies in general have de-
monstrated aberrant brain activity in individuals already with SAD
and it is not possible to tell whether such brain activity was pre-
sent before SAD onset. Longitudinal research will be needed to
determine this. Nonetheless, existing studies suggest that in-
creases in threat value are likely to be reﬂected in the develop-
ment of atypical activity in certain brain areas.
We propose that the SET principle is also reﬂected at the cog-
nitive level in terms of cognitions that highlight for an individual
that social-evaluative stimuli pose a danger to the self. Evidence
suggests negative social-evaluative cognitions about the self in
social contexts (e.g., negative mental representations of the self,
negative social-evaluative thoughts/beliefs, negative social-eva-
luative imagery, negative interpretation biases) are parts of the
cognitive representation of the SET principle. A review of the lit-
erature revealed cross-sectional and experimental studies (see
Table 3) that consistently indicate relative to non-anxious (or low
anxious) controls, individuals already diagnosed with SAD as well2 Those familiar with the social anxiety literature may be wondering how the
SET principle might be different to fear of negative evaluation. Fear of negative
evaluation is a cognitive-affective dimension related to SAD and captures an in-
dividual's concerns about being negatively judged by others. In contrast, the SET
principle is reﬂected along neurobiological and cognitive dimensions, and captures
the extent that social-evaluative stimuli are threatening (i.e., the extent that stimuli
representing judgement from others, regardless of valence of judgement, are
dangerous).
Table 6
Summary of factors proposed in prominent maintenance models of SAD.
Factors Clark and Wells
(1995)
Rapee and Heimberg
(1997)
Hofmann (2007) Moscovitch (2009) Heimberg et al. (2010)
Before social-evaluative situations
Anticipatory processing ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Avoidance behaviour ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
During social-evaluative situations
Negative social-evaluative cognitions ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Self-focus ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Safety behaviours ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cognitive avoidance ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Performance deﬁcits due to anxiety ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Performance deﬁcits due to lack of social
skills
✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Escape behaviour ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Attentional bias to threat ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
After social-evaluative situations
Post-event processing ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Fig. 1. The integrated aetiological and maintenance (IAM) model for SAD. Note. Bold arrows indicate aetiological pathways. Other arrows indicate key maintaining pathways.
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more negative representations of the self (e.g., Mansell and Clark,
1999; Rapee and Abbott, 2006; Wilson and Rapee, 2006), stronger
social-evaluative thoughts/beliefs (e.g., Boden et al., 2012; Gros
and Sarver, 2014; Kley et al., 2012; Wong et al., 2014), endorsed
negative social-evaluative imagery (e.g., Hackmann et al., 2000,
1998), and demonstrated negative interpretation biases (e.g., Ce-
derlund and Öst, 2011; Higa and Daleiden, 2008; Dryman and
Heimberg, 2015; Miers et al., 2008; Schmitz et al., 2011). In terms
of the model, these studies suggest that increases in the threat
value are likely to be reﬂected in the development of negative
social-evaluative cognitions. Notably, for individuals whose cog-
nitive capacity is still in development (e.g., young children), it is
expected that negative social-evaluative cognitions will emerge
when the threat value represented in the SET principle is in-
creased, but they may not have the insight to be able to report on
these cognitions. Moreover, we propose that as an individual
matures cognitively, the complexity of their negative social-eva-
luative cognitions increases (see also Vasey et al., 1994). This latter
proposal remains to be tested and will need to be addressed by
future research.In sum, the SET principle is operationalised at the neurobiolo-
gical and cognitive levels, and accordingly, measurement of the
threat value represented in the SET principle would involve an
assessment of an individual's neurobiological and cognitive re-
sponses to social-evaluative stimuli. The greater the threat value
represented in an individual's SET principle, the more their neu-
robiology will atypically respond to social-evaluative stimuli and
the more severe their negative social-evaluative cognitions. While
there is evidence that supports these characteristics among people
diagnosed with SAD, we argue that a high threat value assigned to
social-evaluative stimuli in the SET principle is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition for a clinical diagnosis of SAD and that such an
elevated threat value for social-evaluative stimuli should precede
development of the clinical disorder.
3.3.3. Factors underlying aetiology of the SET principle
By deﬁnition, the SET principle is a basic human feature, hence
the concept of aetiology refers to factors that increase (or de-
crease) the threat value represented in the SET principle. Threat
values may increase or decrease at any point in an individual's
lifetime, although greater ﬂexibility is likely earlier in life and
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adolescence. In general, individuals will experience varying de-
grees of exposure to the different aetiological factors, and so in-
dividuals will have different threat values assigned to social-eva-
luative stimuli. Following current evidence on aetiological factors
(see Table 2), we focus on inherited tendencies (temperament),
parent behaviours, peer experiences, life events, and culture in this
section as factors that are most likely to lead to variations in the
threat value represented in the SET principle (see Fig. 1). We point
out that it is possible for aetiological factors to inﬂuence each
other. However, in the IAM model, we only link inherited ten-
dencies with parent behaviours and peer experiences because
these relationships are currently the ones with empirical support
(although future research may indicate other links). We also
highlight that it is possible that aetiological factors may be inﬂu-
enced by protective factors, an issue that we will address at the
end of this paper. In the sections that follow, it will be important to
recognise our assertion that the SET principle is correlated with
the construct of social anxiety and with the clinical entity SAD
(although they are distinct constructs). This allows existing re-
search that demonstrates relationships between various aetiolo-
gical factors and social anxiety or SAD to be used as empirical
support for our current suggestions.
3.3.3.1. Inherited tendencies. The term temperament has been used
in different ways in the ﬁeld and various methods have been used
to measure this construct. Despite the fact that temperament as
commonly assessed reﬂects a combination of genetic and en-
vironmental inﬂuence (see Saudino, 2005, for a review), hy-
pothetically, temperament is often seen to have predominantly
genetic inﬂuence (e.g., Kagan, 1989) and may be viewed as an
endophenotype. In turn, these inherited tendencies can be eval-
uated along several dimensions including arousal levels, avoid-
ance, and attentional control (e.g., Zentner and Bates, 2008). We
do not see the SET principle as a form of temperament. Rather,
certain temperaments are expected to raise the threat value re-
presented in the SET principle. For example, an infant's avoidant
temperamental style may lead them to avoid social-evaluative
stimuli as one type of avoided stimuli. Successful avoidance results
in decreased exposure to social-evaluative stimuli and hence un-
certainty regarding such stimuli. Given the aversiveness of un-
certainty, this then provides the circumstances for the infant to
associate social-evaluative stimuli with threat and consequently
there is an increase in the threat value represented in their SET
principle. We propose that temperament has the greatest potential
to inﬂuence the threat value represented in the SET principle from
birth to childhood. We also suggest that the longer the period a
child engages in avoidance as a temperamental style or the
stronger the tendency to avoid (and in doing so avoid social-eva-
luative stimuli), the greater the increase in threat value.
Our proposals are based generally on a review of two lines of
research. First, a line of research has begun to examine the link
between genetics and the temperamental factors most related to
social anxiety (e.g., shyness, behavioural inhibition). Although
existing measures of these temperamental constructs are likely to
capture inherited tendencies to varying degrees, consistent with
the proposed genetic inﬂuence on temperament, a majority of
gene studies have identiﬁed speciﬁc genes that are linked with
shyness and behavioural inhibition (Arbelle et al., 2003; Battaglia
et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2005; Smoller et al., 2003) while reported
null ﬁndings have been in the minority (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2002).
Second, a line of research has examined temperament in rela-
tion to social anxiety, and the most studied temperamental style is
behavioural inhibition. Our review of the literature has indicated
both cross-sectional and longitudinal studies linking behavioural
inhibition and social anxiety or a diagnosis of SAD. Focusing onlongitudinal studies because they can distinguish the temporal
ordering of variables, the majority of such studies have demon-
strated a positive association between childhood behavioural in-
hibition and either social anxiety or a diagnosis of SAD later in
time (e.g., Chronis-Toscano et al., 2009; Hudson et al., 2011; Muris
et al., 2011; Rapee, 2014; see Clauss and Blackford, 2012, for a
meta-analysis; see also Table 2) although the prediction of SAD
from childhood behavioural inhibition is far from perfect. It is also
noteworthy that these studies assess behavioural inhibition typi-
cally in children from 2 to 4 years and thus are unlikely to fully
capture inherited tendencies which are more likely to be present
at an earlier developmental stage. Some studies have identiﬁed
basic early behaviours (e.g., motor activity, crying) that are more
akin to inherited tendencies and predict later behavioural inhibi-
tion (Calkins et al., 1996; Kagan and Snidman, 1991). These studies
taken together: (a) suggest an empirical link from basic early be-
haviours to behavioural inhibition to social anxiety or SAD, and
thus (b) are suggestive of our proposed link between temperament
and the SET principle. Future research will need to explicitly test
this proposed link.
Based on our review of the social anxiety literature, we further
propose that temperament deﬁned as inherited tendencies can
affect two other aetiological factors that in turn can inﬂuence the
threat value represented in an individual's SET principle. First,
there is a body of research that has indicated that an infant's
temperament (e.g., avoidant, inhibited) can elicit certain parent
behaviours (e.g., excessive protection; see Kiff et al., 2011; Rubin
et al., 2009, for reviews). We propose that these parent behaviours
in turn increase the threat value assigned to social-evaluative
stimuli (see Parent behaviours section). Second, a body of research
has indicated that where an infant has opportunities to interact
with similar-aged counterparts, an infant's temperament (e.g.,
avoidant, inhibited) can lead them to experience negative inter-
actions with peers (see Rubin et al., 2009; Sanson et al., 2004, for
reviews). We propose that these negative peer experiences in turn
also increase threat value (see Peer experiences section). Although
we have suggested that temperament can inﬂuence parent beha-
viours and peer experiences, we note that the latter two compo-
nents can act independently of temperament to affect the threat
value represented in the SET principle. For example, a child's SET
principle may be inﬂuenced by parenting behaviours and negative
peer experiences that occur without elicitation by the child's own
temperament (e.g., exposure to parenting style inﬂuenced by ex-
isting parental psychopathology, victimisation from an especially
callous peer).
3.3.3.2. Parent behaviours. A critical aspect of parent/child inter-
actions according to the IAM model is parent behaviours that
provide an opportunity for the child to learn that social-evaluative
stimuli are threatening. Parents may indicate the danger of social-
evaluative stimuli to their child either directly (e.g., verbalisations
that encapsulate negative outcomes associated with exposure to
social-evaluative stimuli) or indirectly (e.g., verbalisations that
encourage or allow avoidance of or escape from social-evaluative
situations; modelling of avoidance/escape). We propose that these
parent behaviours have the potential to increase the threat value
represented in an individual's SET principle from birth onwards.
More speciﬁcally, we suggest that the longer or the more intense
the exposure to these parent behaviours, the greater the increase
in threat value. There are also likely to be sensitive periods (e.g.,
early childhood) where parent behaviours produce a stronger in-
ﬂuence (see Bornstein, 2002).
Our review of studies on parent behaviours in the social anxiety
literature has indicated cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experi-
mental studies that generally support our suggestions. Focusing on
longitudinal and experimental studies because they provide an
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these studies have demonstrated that several parent factors, in-
cluding parenting styles characterised by over-control or over-
protection, insecure parent-child attachment, and expressed par-
ental anxiety during social interactions, play a role in the prediction
of higher levels of later social anxiety and social avoidance in their
children (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Brumariu and Kerns, 2008; de
Rosnay et al., 2006; Hane et al., 2008; Lewis-Morrarty et al., 2012;
see also Table 2). Further research is required though to explicitly
link the parent behaviours described to the SET principle.
3.3.3.3. Peer experiences. Experiences with peers that are likely to
be most inﬂuential according to the IAM model are those that
involve some form of negative evaluation (e.g., ostracism, teasing,
bullying). Such experiences provide the conditions for an in-
dividual to associate social-evaluative stimuli with threat. The
potential for peer experiences to inﬂuence the threat value re-
presented in an individual's SET principle typically starts in
childhood during which there is increased exposure to peers (e.g.,
starting school) and continues through adolescence and beyond.
Over these periods of exposure to peers, direct experiences (e.g.,
being the target of teasing) are likely to be more inﬂuential than
indirect experiences (e.g., hearing about friend being teased). With
regard to direct experiences, the greater the duration of negative
peer experiences (e.g., repeated teasing) or the more severely
negative an experience, the greater the increase in threat value.
The timing of occurrence of negative peer experiences during
sensitive periods (e.g., early childhood) is also likely to have a re-
latively greater effect (see Ladd and Sechler, 2013).
Our proposals are generally supported by our examination of
studies on peer experiences in the social anxiety literature that has
yielded cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. Focusing on
longitudinal studies, the majority of these studies have demon-
strated that negative peer experiences that are most likely to in-
crease the threat value (e.g., relational victimisation, overt victi-
misation, low peer acceptance) predict higher levels of later social
anxiety (e.g., Levinson et al., 2013; Loukas and Pasch, 2013; Ranta
et al., 2013; Siegel et al., 2009; Tillfors et al., 2012; see also Table 2).
Although there is little research evaluating the inﬂuence of sib-
lings on social anxiety, at least one cross-sectional study has
shown an association between sibling violence and social anxiety
disorder in their sibling (Bandelow et al., 2004). However, other
research has failed to demonstrate such an association (Magee,
1999). Overall, an important direction for future research will be to
demonstrate an explicit empirical link between the peer experi-
ences discussed and the SET principle.
3.3.3.4. Life events. Highly stressful or traumatic events with a
social element (e.g., exposure to interpersonal conﬂict in the fa-
mily; physical, emotional, or sexual abuse) provide the conditions
for an individual to associate social-evaluative stimuli with threat
and thus are expected to increase the threat value represented in
the SET principle. The life events described can occur at any time
in an individual's life and inﬂuence the SET principle. Direct ex-
periences with life events (e.g., actually experiencing interpersonal
conﬂict) are likely to be more inﬂuential than indirect experiences
(e.g., hearing about interpersonal conﬂict that happened to
someone else). For direct experiences, we propose that there is a
greater increase in the threat value represented in the SET prin-
ciple for individuals who experience multiple life events of the
sort described or if they experience a single event that is parti-
cularly severe. Furthermore, there are likely to be sensitive periods
(e.g., early childhood) where the occurrence of a life event has a
greater effect on the threat value (see Teicher et al., 2003).
Our proposals are based generally on our review of the research
on life events in the social anxiety ﬁeld. Focusing on longitudinalstudies, the majority of results have shown a positive association
between self-reported negative life events or traumatic social
events and social anxiety (e.g., Aune and Stiles, 2009; Calvete et al.,
2015; Hamilton et al., 2013; see also Table 2). Importantly for the
IAM model, further studies are needed that clearly demonstrate a
link between socially relevant negative life events and the SET
principle.
3.3.3.5. Culture. Aspects of an individual's culture are proposed to
inﬂuence the SET principle and increase the threat value represented
therein. Certain cultures may require individuals to adhere more
strongly than others to speciﬁc social norms and one consequence
for not doing so includes negative evaluation from others (e.g., stig-
ma associated with individuals who have mental health difﬁculties;
individuals who are part of a speciﬁc ethnic or religious group who
are judged according to negative stereotypes). Such cultural values
increase opportunities for individuals who differ from cultural social
norms to associate social-evaluative stimuli with threat. We propose
that an individual's culture has the potential to affect the threat value
represented in their SET principle from birth onwards. Speciﬁcally,
we propose that the longer an individual who differs from cultural
social norms is exposed to a culture that requires adherence to those
norms, or the more strongly the culture enforces the norms (e.g., the
culture may emphasise the social costs of negative evaluation), the
greater the increase in threat value. Moreover, there are likely to be
sensitive periods (e.g., early childhood) where an individual's culture
is more likely to have a greater inﬂuence on the SET principle (see
Heine and Lehman, 2004).
These suggestions are supported generally by our examination
of research on culture in the social anxiety literature that has in-
dicated only cross-sectional studies. These studies have generally
shown an association between cultural variables and social anxi-
ety (see Table 2). For example, one line of studies has demon-
strated on balance that compared to individuals of Caucasian
descent, individuals of Asian descent endorse higher social anxiety
levels (e.g., see Kreig and Xu, 2015; Woody et al., 2015, for meta-
analyses). Compared with Western countries, many Asian coun-
tries are more likely to be collectivistic and generally there are
stricter social rules and greater social costs for individuals who
deviate from those rules in collectivistic countries compared to
individualistic countries (Heinrichs et al., 2006). Notably, there is
another line of cross-sectional research that has demonstrated
associations between different cultural regions and a diagnosis of
SAD (see Brockveld et al., 2014; Hofmann et al., 2010, for reviews).
However, this research more likely reﬂects cultural inﬂuences on
the impairment produced by social reticence and the subsequent
assignment of a disorder (Rapee et al., 2011), an issue that is dis-
cussed later in this paper. A great deal more research will be
needed to explicitly link cultural factors to the SET principle.
3.3.3.6. Summary. We propose ﬁve aetiological factors (inherited
tendencies, parent behaviours, peer experiences, life events, and
culture) that can each inﬂuence the threat value represented in the
SET principle. We also propose that two of these aetiological fac-
tors (parent behaviours and peer experiences) can themselves be
inﬂuenced by one of the other factors (inherited tendencies). For
each aetiological factor, the longer the duration, the greater the
intensity, or if the factor occurs during a sensitive period, the
greater the inﬂuence on the threat value represented in the SET
principle.
3.3.4. The SET principle and the development of primary cognitive
and behavioural processes that aim to detect and eliminate social-
evaluative threat
We have proposed several factors that can facilitate the
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cortex activity) and cognitive changes (negative social-evaluative
cognitions) that reﬂect the threat value represented in the SET
principle. These neurobiological and cognitive changes under-
pinning the principle are proposed to support further neurobio-
logical, cognitive, and behavioural developments that enhance an
individual's ability to detect and eliminate social-evaluative threat
(see Fig. 1). Hence, across development, an increase in the threat
value represented in the principle will result in the improved
detection and elimination of social-evaluative threat.
The detection of social-evaluative threat is underpinned by
developments in neurobiological (e.g., amygdala; Cisler and Koster,
2010) and cognitive processes that increase attention directed to
both the self (e.g., to detect internal bodily signals or negative
cognitions that indicate social-evaluative threat; to detect one's
performance or appearance and how it is observable to others)
and the external environment (e.g., detection of negative evalua-
tion from other people; cf. Table 6). We consider these cognitive
processes to be ‘primary’ because they are proposed to be part of
the ﬁrst set of processes that emerge in response to increases in
the threat value represented in the SET principle. Our review of
the social anxiety literature on attention (see Schultz and Heim-
berg, 2008, for another review) has yielded cross-sectional and
experimental studies that have provided fairly consistent support
for an association between high trait social anxiety levels and high
levels of trait or state self-focused attention (e.g., Bögels et al.,
2014; Gaydukevych and Kocovski, 2012; Glick and Orsillo, 2011;
Hodson et al., 2008; see also Table 4). Cross-sectional and ex-
perimental studies have also provided fairly consistent support for
an association between high trait social anxiety levels and atten-
tion towards social threat (e.g., Eastwood et al., 2005; Mogg et al.,
2004; Moriya and Tanno, 2011; Pishyar et al., 2004; Sposari and
Rapee, 2007; see also Table 4). That is, higher levels of social an-
xiety are associated with enhanced detection of or preferential
allocation of attention to negative social stimuli (e.g., angry faces)
relative to control stimuli. Overall, the weight of the evidence
provides support for our proposal that both attention directed to
the self and to potential indicators of evaluation in the environ-
ment play a role in the detection of social-evaluative threat. Fur-
ther research will be needed to demonstrate that the neurobio-
logical and cognitive aspects of the SET principle are explicitly
linked to these primary cognitive processes.
The elimination of social-evaluative threat is underpinned by
developments in neurobiological (e.g., amygdala and projections
to motor areas; Hofmann et al., 2012; Kent and Rauch, 2003) and
behavioural processes that increase physical avoidance of and es-
cape from social-evaluative threat (cf. Table 6). Again, we consider
these behavioural processes to be ‘primary’ given they are part of
the ﬁrst set of processes that develop in response to increases in
the threat value represented in the SET principle.3 Our review of
the social anxiety literature has yielded cross-sectional studies
that have shown that avoidance and escape are consistently as-
sociated with high levels of social anxiety and SAD (e.g., Carleton
et al., 2010; Heuer et al., 2007; Ottenbreit et al., 2014; Whiteside
et al., 2013; Wong and Moulds, 2011a; see also Table 4). These
ﬁndings provide support for our proposal that avoidance and es-
cape play a role in the elimination of social-evaluative threat.3 An interesting point to consider from the perspective of the IAM model is the
relative amounts of time that would be devoted to detecting and eliminating social-
evaluative threat. Overall, the detection of social-evaluative threat is likely to take
relatively less time because this involves the attentional system in the IAM model
(i.e., self-focus and attention towards threat in the environment) working in an
automatic fashion. In contrast, elimination of social-evaluative threat is likely to
take relatively more time because implementation of avoidance strategies might
require consideration and adaptation to the social-evaluative situation at hand.Further research is necessary however to show that the neuro-
biological and cognitive aspects of the SET principle are explicitly
linked with these primary behavioural processes.
3.3.5. The consequences of the primary cognitive and behavioural
processes that aim to detect and eliminate social-evaluative threat
The changes in neurobiology (e.g., amygdala, projections from
the amygdala), cognition (primary attentional processes), and be-
haviours (primary avoidance/escape processes) that enhance an
individual's ability to detect and eliminate social-evaluative threat
increase the probability of three outcomes.
3.3.5.1. Outcome 1: maintenance of the threat value of social-eva-
luative stimuli
Although the primary cognitive and behavioural processes (and
associated neurobiology) are intended to detect and eliminate
social-evaluative threat respectively, their operation is also ex-
pected to maintain the threat value represented in an individual's
SET principle. For example, the primary cognitive process of self-
focus enhances an individual's ability to detect internal threat
responses (e.g., physiological signals or negative social-evaluative
cognitions that occur during social-evaluative situations). These
responses when detected are interpreted in line with the in-
dividual's SET principle and consequently reinforce the threat
value represented in the principle (see also previously discussed
literature related to interpretation biases in the section on the
SET Principle). Similarly, the primary cognitive process of attention
towards the social environment enhances the detection of
social cues that are interpreted as threatening. In this way the
primary cognitive processes that detect social-evaluative threat
serve to maintain the threat value representation of the SET
principle.
Our review of studies on attention directed to the self and to
the environment in the social anxiety literature has indicated
evidence that is consistent with the maintenance function of the
primary cognitive processes (see also Schultz and Heimberg, 2008,
for another review). A majority of experimental studies have de-
monstrated that the induction of state self-focus results in higher
levels of state social anxiety and more negative social-evaluative
thoughts (e.g., Bögels and Lamers, 2002; Gaydukevych and Ko-
covski, 2012; Woody and Rodriguez, 2000; see also Table 4). Fur-
thermore, a majority of experimental studies that have looked at
manipulation of attentional biases has shown that training atten-
tion away from stimuli related to social threat towards neutral
stimuli in socially anxious individuals results in lower levels of
social anxiety (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Heeren et al., 2011, 2012; Li
et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2009; see also Table 4). Building on
these studies, further research will be needed to demonstrate a
maintenance effect of the primary cognitive processes on the
neurobiological and cognitive aspects of the SET principle.
The primary behavioural processes that operate to eliminate
social-evaluative threat are also expected to maintain the threat
value represented in the SET principle. To illustrate, an individual
who avoids or escapes a social situation prevents exposure to an
opportunity that potentially allows them to acquire evidence
against their SET principle, thereby preserving the threat value. As
a basis for the proposed maintenance effect of the primary beha-
vioural processes, our review of the social anxiety literature yiel-
ded experimental studies, the majority of which indicated that
exposure to social-evaluative situations without avoidance or es-
cape results in decreased social-evaluative anxiety and positive
social outcomes (e.g., Kim, 2005; Rinck et al., 2013; Smits and
Powers et al., 2006; Smits and Rosenﬁeld et al., 2006; Taylor and
Amir, 2012; see also Table 4). Future research should explicitly
demonstrate the described maintenance effect of the primary
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ponents of the SET principle.
3.3.5.2. Outcome 2: development and operation of performance
deﬁcits
The emergence and subsequent operation of primary cognitive
and behavioural processes that detect and eliminate social-eva-
luative threat should increase the likelihood of performance deﬁ-
cits in social-evaluative situations (cf. Table 6; see Fig. 1). Situa-
tionally, performance deﬁcits can occur either through the per-
formance-interfering inﬂuence of increased anxiety (following
increased detection of social-evaluative threat) or through the
reduction in attentional resources available for competent per-
formance (as a result of attentional resources allocated to the
detection of social-evaluative threat). Over the longer term, re-
peated avoidance of and escape from social situations will reduce
opportunities to develop age-appropriate social skills and knowl-
edge, thereby also contributing to the occurrence of performance
deﬁcits. In line with previous models (e.g., Clark and Wells, 1995;
Rapee and Heimberg, 1997), performance deﬁcits should increase
the probability that an individual will experience negative eva-
luation from others and in this way reinforce the threat value re-
presented in their SET principle.4 Hence this conceptualisation
incorporates two proposals: (a) the primary cognitive and beha-
vioural processes potentially cause performance deﬁcits due to
anxiety, restricted attentional resources, or a lack of age-appro-
priate social skills/knowledge and (b) these performance deﬁcits
will serve to maintain the threat value represented in an in-
dividual's SET principle.
Consistent with our proposals, our review of the literature
yielded cross-sectional studies on performance deﬁcits, the ma-
jority of which indicated that individuals who are most likely to
possess a SET principle with a high threat value (i.e., socially an-
xious individuals) exhibit performance deﬁcits on social-evalua-
tive tasks (e.g., Alfano et al., 2006; Baker and Edelman, 2002; In-
derbitzen-Nolan et al., 2007; Spence et al., 1999; Voncken and
Bögels, 2008; see also Table 4). Future research should explicitly
examine the neurobiological and cognitive aspects of the SET
principle and their link with performance deﬁcits and how these
might change across development. Moreover, it is evident that
further research is needed on the different mechanisms by which
performance deﬁcits might occur as well as the maintenance effect
of performance deﬁcits.
3.3.5.3. Outcome 3: development and operation of secondary cog-
nitive and behavioural processes
Following the emergence of the primary cognitive and beha-
vioural processes, we predict that another set of cognitive and
behavioural processes aimed at detecting and eliminating social-
evaluative threat will develop as the individual matures (see
Fig. 1). We consider this subsequent set of cognitive and beha-
vioural processes to be ‘secondary’ because they are proposed to4 The key result of performance deﬁcits from the perspective of the IAM model
is the increased probability of actual negative evaluation and reinforcement of the
threat value of social-evaluative stimuli. There are two other important points re-
lated to this issue. First, it is possible in some instances that performance deﬁcits do
not lead to negative evaluation from others (e.g., other people have not detected
the deﬁcits or others have detected the deﬁcits but do not negatively evaluate).
However, in the context of the IAM model, performance deﬁcits of signiﬁcance are
those that increase the probability of negative evaluation from others. Second, the
speciﬁc effects of performance deﬁcits might depend on insight. For example, an
individual with performance deﬁcits might have insight into these deﬁcits, and
thus become anxious when approaching social-evaluative situations, further in-
creasing the likelihood of disrupted performance and negative evaluation from
others. It is also possible that an individual with performance deﬁcits may not have
insight into their deﬁcits, and takes part in social-evaluative situations with the
result that they are negatively perceived by others.emerge after the primary processes.
We propose the primary cognitive processes (i.e., attention to
the self and to the social environment) support the development
of complex secondary cognitive processes that aim to detect so-
cial-evaluative threat before and after social situations. These
processes are commonly referred to as anticipatory processing and
post-event processing (cf. Table 6). Interestingly, conceptualisa-
tions of anticipatory processing and post-event processing involve
elements of self-focus and a focus on negative evaluation (e.g.,
Clark and Wells, 1995), which may allude to the origins of these
complex secondary processes from the primary cognitive pro-
cesses that we have proposed. The operation of anticipatory pro-
cessing and post-event processing is expected to enhance the
detection of social cues that are interpreted as threatening in ac-
cordance with the SET principle, resulting in the reinforcement of
the threat value represented in the principle. Furthermore, in line
with previous models (e.g., Clark and Wells, 1995; Hofmann,
2007), engaging in anticipatory processing and post-event pro-
cessing is likely to interfere with an individual's ability to effec-
tively engage with others upon entering social situations at future
points in time (e.g., anticipatory processing and post-event pro-
cessing are likely to contribute to the generation of state anxiety
via the SET principle that interferes with engagement upon en-
tering a social-evaluative situation). This increases the probability
of negative evaluation from others and the likelihood that the
threat value in the SET principle is reinforced. We have thus put
forth two main proposals: (a) primary cognitive processes play an
aetiological role for anticipatory processing and post-event pro-
cessing, and (b) anticipatory processing and post-event processing
function to maintain the SET principle.
These proposals are based generally on our review of the social
anxiety literature on anticipatory processing and post-event pro-
cessing. Cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experimental studies
were found that consistently demonstrated that trait social anxiety
is positively associated with both anticipatory processing (e.g.,
Hinrichsen and Clark, 2003; Hodson et al., 2008; Miers et al., 2014;
Mills et al., 2013; Vassilopoulos, 2004) and post-event processing
(e.g., Makkar and Grisham, 2011; Miers et al., 2014; Schmitz et al.,
2011; Wong, 2015; see Brozovich and Heimberg, 2008; Penney and
Abbott, 2014, for reviews; see also Table 4). Additionally, in sup-
port of the maintenance function of the secondary cognitive pro-
cesses, the majority of experimental studies have shown that en-
gaging in anticipatory processing (e.g., Hinrichsen and Clark, 2003;
Mills et al., 2014a, 2014b; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wong and Moulds,
2011b) and post-event processing (e.g., Brozovich and Heimberg,
2011, 2013; Kocovski et al., 2011; Rowa et al., 2014; Wong and
Moulds, 2009) results in higher levels of social anxiety and
more negative cognitive outcomes for socially anxious individuals
(see also Table 4). Based on our review, it is clear that further re-
search is needed to examine the neurobiological and cognitive
aspects of the SET principle and their links with the secondary
cognitive processes, as well as the maintenance effect of the sec-
ondary cognitive processes on the SET principle. Moreover, it is
evident that there is a lack of studies on the role that the primary
cognitive processes play in the development of anticipatory pro-
cessing and post-event processing, an area that will need to be
addressed by future research (see also section on directions for
future research in relation to the combined cognitive bias hy-
pothesis; Hirsch et al., 2006).
The primary behavioural processes (i.e., avoidance and escape)
are expected to support the emergence of more subtle and com-
plex secondary cognitive and behavioural processes that aim to
eliminate social-evaluative threat. As an individual matures, they
are increasingly exposed to social-evaluative situations with more
complex social rules and social-evaluative threat they cannot avoid
or escape. Hence, there is a need for the evolution of more
5 In the previous section on Culture, we provided evidence that compared to
individuals of Caucasian descent, individuals of Asian descent endorse higher social
anxiety levels (e.g., Heinrichs et al., 2006). In the current section, we have provided
evidence that indicates that the lifetime prevalence of SAD is generally higher in
Western regions of the world compared to Asian countries (e.g., Hofmann et al.,
2010). These two statements might seem contradictory, but are compatible with
each other. Individuals in Asian countries might have higher social anxiety levels
compared to individuals from Western countries, but because socially anxious
traits are more acceptable in Asian cultures compared to Western cultures (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2009), such traits therefore might be less likely to be deemed as pro-
blematic in the former versus the latter culture. This would be consistent with an
overall lower rate of SAD in Asian countries than Western countries.
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social-evaluative threat in these circumstances without physically
removing oneself. We refer to such behavioural strategies as safety
behaviours (or subtle avoidance) and parallel cognitive strategies
as cognitive avoidance (cf. Table 6). The occurrence of safety
behaviours and cognitive avoidance prevents an individual from
being exposed to evidence that runs contrary to the threat value
represented in their SET principle and in this way maintains
the threat value. In line with previous models (e.g., Rapee and
Heimberg, 1997; Heimberg et al., 2010), safety behaviours and
cognitive avoidance are also likely to prevent individuals from
effectively engaging with social-evaluative situations. This in-
creases the probability of negative evaluation from others and the
likelihood that the threat value represented in the SET principle is
maintained. We have thus indicated two main predictions:
(a) primary behavioural processes contribute to the aetiology of
safety behaviours and cognitive avoidance, and (b) safety beha-
viours and cognitive avoidance will serve to maintain the SET
principle.
Our proposals have their general basis in cross-sectional,
longitudinal, and experimental studies on safety behaviours and
cognitive avoidance that have been obtained from our review of
the social anxiety literature. These studies have demonstrated that
trait social anxiety has consistent associations with safety beha-
viours (e.g., Cuming et al., 2009; McManus et al., 2008; Plasencia
et al., 2011; Stangier et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2012) and cognitive
avoidance (e.g., Breen and Kashdan, 2011; Kashdan et al., 2013,
2014; Panayiotou et al., 2014; see also Table 4). Furthermore, in
line with the maintenance function of safety behaviours, experi-
mental studies have consistently demonstrated that the use of
safety behaviours results in higher social-evaluative anxiety
(Langer and Rodebaugh, 2013) and the reduction of safety seeking
behaviours leads to lower social-evaluative anxiety and reductions
in anxiety-related self-judgements (Morgan and Rafﬂe, 1999;
Taylor and Alden, 2010, 2011; Wells et al., 1995; see also Table 4).
Notably, one study has demonstrated that individuals with SAD
who were instructed to reduce safety behaviours relative to those
who were not given such instructions in the context of a con-
versation: (a) were judged by independent observers as exhibiting
less anxiety-related behaviours and more social approach
behaviours, and (b) elicited more positive reactions from their
conversational partner (i.e., greater partner willingness to engage
individual; Taylor and Alden, 2011). This study supports our pro-
posal that safety behaviours can interfere with an individual's
engagement with social-evaluative situations and lead to negative
judgements from others. Similar experimental ﬁndings for cogni-
tive avoidance have yet to be demonstrated in the social anxiety
literature. As for the IAM model, future research will need to
demonstrate explicit links between the neurobiological and cog-
nitive aspects of the SET principle and the secondary cognitive
and behavioural processes that aim to eliminate social-evaluative
threat. Future research will also need to focus on demonstrating
the maintenance effect of these secondary cognitive and beha-
vioural processes on the SET principle. Furthermore, the
role of primary behavioural processes in the development of
safety behaviours and cognitive avoidance will need to be
investigated.
3.3.5.4. Summary
Increases in the threat value represented in the SET principle
encourage the development of primary cognitive and behavioural
processes that detect and eliminate social-evaluative threat. These
primary processes increase the likelihood that: (a) the threat value
of an individual's SET principle is maintained, (b) an individual
exhibits performance deﬁcits (due to anxiety, limited attention, or
a lack of age-appropriate social skills/knowledge), and (c) anindividual develops secondary cognitive and behavioural pro-
cesses that further aim to detect and eliminate social-evaluative
threat in more complex ways.
3.3.6. The SET principle and the development of SAD
Each of the components of the IAM model that have ultimately
developed from increases in the threat value represented in the
SET principle (i.e., primary and secondary processes, performance
deﬁcits) serve to maintain this threat value. In turn, maintenance
of the threat value drives the operation of the primary and sec-
ondary processes and the associated occurrence of performance
deﬁcits. Thus, all the components form a self-perpetuating cycle.
The components at this point in the IAM model are neither a
problem or a disorder. It is what happens in the latter sections of
the model that moves an individual to experience a clinical
disorder.
Individuals with SET principles where social-evaluative stimuli
are assigned with higher threat values are expected to experience
more frequent anxiety and higher levels of anxiety in relation to
social-evaluative situations. Hence, an individual with a SET
principle that social-evaluative stimuli are extremely threatening
is more likely to: (a) develop maintaining factor components that
each operate at a high severity level over time (e.g., more persis-
tent and pervasive avoidance of social-evaluative stimuli, self-fo-
cus and attentional focus to social-evaluative threat in the en-
vironment that happens more frequently and is more difﬁcult to
disengage from) and maintain the individual's extreme threat
value assigned to social-evaluative stimuli, and (b) experience
frequent anxiety and severe levels of anxiety whenever social-
evaluative stimuli are encountered. An important direction for
future research will be to examine the suggested relationship
between the neurobiological and cognitive aspects of the SET
principle and more frequent/severe anxiety that is experienced in
relation to social-evaluative situations.
We further propose that an individual who experiences fre-
quent/severe anxiety as a result of their SET principle is expected
to have an increased likelihood of life interference and a diagnosis
of SAD. Notably, in line with previous theorising (Rapee and
Spence, 2004), there is an imperfect correspondence between
frequent/severe anxiety in relation to social-evaluative situations
and life interference because the latter also depends on other
factors, such as a person's age, gender, life goals, and culture. For
example, cultural norms and expectations are likely to inﬂuence
the acceptability of socially anxious behaviours and hence affect
whether these behaviours cause personal distress or are deemed
to interfere with one's functioning (e.g., Rapee et al., 2011; Schreier
et al., 2010). To further illustrate with a speciﬁc example, evidence
indicates that the lifetime prevalence of SAD is generally higher in
Western regions of the world compared to Asian countries (e.g.,
Hofmann et al., 2010) consistent with a more positive attitude
toward socially reticent behaviour among Eastern compared with
Western populations that is applied from childhood (Chen et al.,
2009, 1998).5
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development of commensurate maintaining factors and the in-
dividual experiences anxiety in social-evaluative situations yet
experiences no life interference and does not meet criteria for a
diagnosis of SAD. For such an individual to have an increased
likelihood to meet criteria for SAD, they would need to be exposed
to one or more of the proposed aetiological factors. Exposure to
such factors would likely increase the threat value represented in
the individual's SET principle. This in turn would increase the
probability of two outcomes; ﬁrst, the individual's maintaining
factor components would be expected to operate with greater
severity, and second, the individual should experience more fre-
quent and severe anxiety in relation to social-evaluative situations
which increase the probability of life interference and a diagnosis
of SAD (although as previously noted the inﬂuence of other factors
on life interference would also need to be considered).
In sum, the SET principle and the components that develop
from this principle together form a self-perpetuating cycle that
ultimately results in the experience of anxiety in relation to social-
evaluative situations. This self-perpetuating cycle may develop
and operate in the absence of a diagnosis of SAD. However, the
greater the threat value represented in an individual's SET prin-
ciple, the greater the operational severity of the maintaining factor
components, and the more likely the individual will experience
frequent/severe social-evaluative anxiety, experience life inter-
ference and meet criteria for SAD.4. Limitations and directions for future research
The IAM model provides a framework to encourage future re-
search to more closely integrate understanding of factors that
underlie both the aetiology and maintenance of SAD. We have
already highlighted speciﬁc areas of the model that require further
research. These suggested lines of future inquiry, together with
several other proposed lines of investigation based on the IAM
model, will be elaborated upon in this section. First, as is evident
in the presentation of our model, there is currently only indirect
evidence supporting factors that initiate an increase in the threat
value represented in the SET principle. Although studies have in-
dicated that several of the aetiological factors are linked with ei-
ther higher levels of social anxiety or a diagnosis of SAD, there is a
need for longitudinal studies that examine the interrelationships
between the proposed aetiological factors and later neurobiolo-
gical changes (e.g., amygdala reactivity to social-evaluative sti-
muli) and cognitive changes (e.g., negative social-evaluative cog-
nitions) that reﬂect the SET principle.
A second related line of investigation will need to examine the
aetiological factors in more detail. As is evident in the IAM model,
aetiological factors differ in the developmental period during
which they have the greatest potential to inﬂuence the threat
value in the SET principle. As such, certain aetiological factors may
play a larger role in the development of SAD for some individuals
depending on the age of onset of SAD and future research should
examine this. For example, for individuals with SAD who report
that they have “always been this way” suggesting a very early onset
of the disorder, inherited tendencies may play a relatively large
aetiological role in increasing the threat value of social-evaluative
stimuli early on. Future research will also need to examine whe-
ther there are protective factors that buffer against the proposed
effect of aetiological factors. Protective factors may simply be the
reverse of proposed aetiological factors. As an example from the
literature on temperament and parenting, Lewis-Morrarty et al.
(2012) showed a signiﬁcant link between consistently high beha-
vioural inhibition and higher levels of later social anxiety in the
presence of high maternal overcontrol, while there was no suchlink in the presence of low maternal overcontrol. This ﬁnding as
applied to the IAM model may mean that inherited tendencies can
increase the threat value represented in the SET principle. How-
ever, the additional presence of parent behaviours that encourage
a child to learn that social-evaluative stimuli are not threatening
(e.g., parents expose their child to and allow them to cope with
novel social situations) may act as a protective factor that prevents
the threat value represented in the SET principle from increasing.
There may also be protective factors that are not simply the re-
verse of proposed aetiological factors. For example, in the context
of peer experiences, there is evidence that the impact of peer
victimisation is decreased when children have a close friendship
(e.g., Hodges et al., 1999). In general, future research should ex-
amine protective factors in relation to the aetiological factors of
the IAM model. On a related point, future research will need to
consider the potential interactions between the aetiological factors
themselves proposed in the IAM model, as well as potential in-
teractions between the proposed maintaining factors (cf. com-
bined cognitive bias hypothesis; Hirsch et al., 2006).
A third avenue for future investigation as indicated in previous
sections concerns whether the neurobiological and cognitive
changes that represent the SET principle lead to the development
of the primary cognitive and behavioural processes that detect and
eliminate social-evaluative threat. In other words, there is a need
for longitudinal studies that investigate whether increases in the
threat value represented in the SET principle (e.g., increases in
amygdala reactivity to social-evaluative stimuli, greater endorse-
ment of negative social-evaluative cognitions) predicts enhanced
detection of social-evaluative threat (e.g., stronger self-focus and
attentional biases towards social-evaluative threat in the en-
vironment) and elimination of the threat (e.g., greater tendency to
avoid/escape social-evaluative threat). Another possibility for fu-
ture research is to examine whether experimental manipulation of
the neurobiological and cognitive aspects of the SET principle
leads to predicted changes in self-focus, attentional biases towards
social-evaluative threat, and avoidance/escape behaviours. For
example, using real-time functional brain imaging and neuro-
feedback techniques (see Caria et al., 2012; deCharms, 2008;
Hofmann et al., 2012), individuals may be trained to self-regulate
amygdala reactivity to social-evaluative stimuli over a period of
time (i.e., manipulation of neurobiological representation of SET
principle) to see whether this leads to decreases in each of the
primary cognitive and behavioural processes. Of course, future
studies along the lines described will need to take into account
potential moderators of the operation of the relevant processes.
For example, the availability of attentional control resources is
likely to affect the operation of the primary cognitive processes
(see e.g., Judah et al., 2013).
A fourth line of research that has been highlighted in previous
sections involves the examination of whether the primary cogni-
tive and behavioural processes that detect and eliminate social-
evaluative threat are precursors to the other relevant maintaining
factor components. Speciﬁcally, targeted longitudinal studies
should determine whether: (a) stronger self-focus and attentional
biases towards social-evaluative threat in the environment predict
more severe performance deﬁcits due to anxiety/limited attention
as well as stronger anticipatory processing and post-event pro-
cessing later in time, and (b) a stronger tendency to avoid/escape
social-evaluative threat predicts more severe performance deﬁcits
due to a lack of age-appropriate social skills/knowledge and more
severe safety behaviours as well as cognitive avoidance later in
time. Manipulation of the primary cognitive and behavioural
processes may also assist in the examination of their proposed
role. For example, training individuals to self-focus and attend to
social-evaluative threat (e.g., see Beard, 2011) should increase later
anticipatory processing and post-event processing.
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model holistically. Speciﬁcally, future research will need to ex-
amine whether individuals who have a SET principle where social-
evaluative stimuli have a higher threat value (e.g., greater amyg-
dala reactivity to social-evaluative stimuli and stronger negative
social-evaluative cognitions) exhibit higher levels of the main-
taining factor components. Furthermore, as alluded to in previous
sections, there is a need to examine whether: (a) such individuals
experience more frequent and higher anxiety in relation to social-
evaluative situations, (b) such individuals experience greater life
interference, and (c) there is a higher rate of SAD in these in-
dividuals (relative to individuals with SET principles where social-
evaluative stimuli have lower threat values).
A sixth line of research should examine the speciﬁcity of the
proposed aetiological and maintaining factors of the IAM model to
SAD. We have described how speciﬁc aetiological factors can in-
crease the threat value of social-evaluative stimuli represented in
the SET principle and ultimately increase vulnerability for SAD, but
the factors might also have broader effects than what we have
indicated in the IAM model, such as increasing vulnerability to
other disorders (i.e., transdiagnostic risk factors; see Nolen-Hoek-
sema and Watkins, 2011). For example, highly stressful or trau-
matic events with a social element as we have indicated might
contribute vulnerability for SAD, but might also contribute vul-
nerability for other disorders such as post-traumatic stress dis-
order or depression. Thus, it may be fruitful for future research to
examine the effect of an aetiological factor as proposed in the IAM
model as well as any broader effect of the factor that may be re-
levant to other disorders. A similar point can be made about the
maintaining factors of the IAM model.
Should the previous suggested lines of research provide helpful
insights into the development and persistence of SAD, a seventh
line of research will need to examine how these insights can
translate into novel prevention and treatment strategies for SAD
that enhance existing strategies. For example, for individuals al-
ready diagnosed with SAD, future research might examine whe-
ther the neurobiological and cognitive aspects of the SET principle
can be treatment targets (see Hofmann et al., 2012) that lead to a
decrease in the operational severity of the maintaining factor
components and potential remission of SAD. Moreover, for ‘high-
risk’ individuals not yet diagnosed with SAD, and given in the IAM
model that the SET principle is a precursor to the maintaining
factor components which in turn are precursors to the onset of
SAD, it may be possible to target the neurobiological and cognitive
aspects of the SET principle to decrease the operational severity of
the maintaining factor components early so that the onset of SAD
is prevented. Future research will determine whether there are
other novel ways to prevent and treat SAD based on the IAM
model.5. Conclusions
The IAM model extends the current literature on the develop-
ment and persistence of SAD by uniting current theory on the
aetiology and maintenance of the disorder and providing a much-
needed evidence-based framework that: (a) integrates proposed
aetiological and maintaining factors for SAD, (b) speciﬁes a novel
account of the developmental sequence from the action of pro-
posed aetiological factors to increases in the threat value of social-
evaluative stimuli represented in the SET principle, followed by
the emergence of the maintaining factor components, and then
the onset of SAD, and (c) explains the development of the main-
taining factors, how an individual develops SAD, and how SAD is
maintained. The IAM model thus provides a comprehensive un-
derstanding of the development and persistence of SAD based oncurrent theory and research and it is our hope that the model
stimulates new research that furthers our understanding and im-
proves prevention and treatment strategies for SAD.Acknowledgements
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